As a knowledge-based economy, the Netherlands is vulnerable to digital hybrid threats from state and non-state actors. The Dutch strategic military leadership sees the importance of improving its digital defense, but struggles with the right approach. This research, based on a heuristic method including literature reviews and interviews, provides an answer to the question, “How can Dutch Special Operations Forces (SOF) enhance the national cyber capabilities to counter the hybrid threats that the Netherlands currently faces?” by offering three options: 1) SOF can gain access to hard targets for cyber operations; 2) it can provide the means to get wetware, hardware, and software in or out the operation area; and 3) it can understand, deceive, and influence the cultural environment. Furthermore, the thesis provides the Dutch Ministry of Defense three potential integration options for SOF and cyber capabilities. The ministry can 1) delegate cyber-SOF teams to the operational commands; 2) embed SOF and cyber personnel in each other’s organizations; and 3) create a new cyber-enabled special operations unit. With the new Special Operations Command, the Defense Cyber Command, and the Joint SIGINT Cyber Unit, there are opportunities for SOF to support cyber operations and increase the digital security for the Netherlands and its NATO allies.

Subjects: composite special operations command; cyber supporting operations; cyber terrorism; defense cyber command; ministry of defense; hackers; hacktivists; hybrid threat; hybrid warfare; offensive cyber operations; information warfare; intelligence; irregular warfare; secret services; special operations command; special operations forces; strategic implications; technology; the Netherlands; unconventional warfare